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Plaintiff-wife brought an action for an-
nulment on the grounds that defendant
had falsely and fraudulently concealed
from her the fact that he had been a Nazi
army officer, that he believed in the ex-
termination of the Jewish people, and
that he would require her to cease social-
izing with all her Jewish friends. In re-
versing the appellate division's dismissal
of the action, the Court of Appeals held
that the triers of fact might find that the
concealment went to the essence of the
marital contract, thereby making the mar-
riage "unworkable." Kober v. Kober,
16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 N.E.2d 817, 264
N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965).
As a general rule, any marriage pro-
cured by fraud is either void or voidable
since it lacks the necessary element of
mutual consent.' However, because of
the special nature of the marriage con-
tract and the public interest in fostering
its permanence, it has often been held that
the fraud involved must concern the es-
13 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 31.29
(2d ed. 1945).
sentialia of the marriage relationship, i.e.,
cohabitation and consortium.2 Under this
theory, fraudulent misrepresentations as
to accidental attributes and personality
traits of the individual are normally not
deemed to be of such an essential nature.
Thus, fraud concerning birth, social posi-
tion, fortune, good health or temperament
is not sufficient to vitiate the marriage
contract.3
New York applied the essentialia test4
until 1903, when the Court of Appeals,
in di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo,5 enunciated
a more liberal rule which allowed the
granting of an annulment for any fraud
going to the essence of the contract.' In
2Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. 605 (1862);
see also Vanneman, Annulment of Marriages
for Fraud, 9 MINN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1925).
3 See 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARA-
TION §§ 452-528 (1891); 3 NELSON, Op. Cit.
supra note 1, §§ 31.29-31.70; 1 SCHOULER, MAR-
RIAGE, SEPARATION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS
§§ 23-24 (6th ed. 1921).
4 See, e.g., Fisk v. Fisk, 6 App. Div. 432, 39
N.Y. Supp. 537 (Ist Dep't 1896); Clarke v.
Clarke, 11 Abb. Pr. 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
2 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
6 See Crouch, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud
in New York, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 404-05
(1923); Fraud in the New York Law of Annul-
ment, 9 BROOKLYN L. REV. 51, 55-58 (1940).
di Lorenzo, the defendant-wife falsely
represented to plaintiff that he was the
father of her child. Plaintiff contended
that he was thereby induced to marry de-
fendant, and that but for such representa-
tion, he would not have done so. The
Court found that while public policy is
concerned with the regulation of the mar-
riage relation, the marriage contract has
been regarded as any other civil contract,
the essential elements of which are con-
sent and the capacity to consent. 7 The
absence of either element would make the
marriage void or voidable. Any fraud,
therefore, which is "material, to that de-
gree that, had it not been practiced, the
party deceived would not have consented
to the marriage" would be sufficient basis
for annulment.8 Furthermore, the fraud
must be of such a nature as would deceive
a reasonably prudent person.' The
ground on which the annulment is sought
must not be capricious or fanciful,' ° but
must relate to matters which go to the
7 di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 472,
67 N.E. 63, 64 (1903); accord, Shonfeld v.
Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933);
O'Connell v. O'Connell, 201 App. Div. 338,
194 N.Y. Supp. 265 (1st Dep't 1922).
8 di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, supra note 7, at 471,
67 N.E. at 64. Accord, Domschke v. Domschke,
138 App. Div. 454, 122 N.Y. Supp. 892 (2d
Dep't 1910). "[If it be shown . . . that the
same thing would have been done by the par-
ties, in the same way, if the fraud had not
been practiced, it cannot be deemed material."
Id. at 458, 122 N.Y. Supp. at 895, citing 2
PARSONS, CONTRACTS 895 (8th ed. 1893).
9 di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, supra note 7, at 474-
75, 67 N.E. at 65; Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, supra
note 7, at 481, 184 N.E. at 61; Levy v. Levy,
309 Mass. 230, 34 N.E.2d 650 (1941). See
Crouch, supra note 6, at 407.
10 Laarge v. Laarge, 176 Misc. 190, 193, 26
N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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essence and substance of the contract."
Thus, in Shonfeld v. Shonfeld,12 an
annulment was granted where the wife
falsely represented that she had sufficient
money to establish the husband in busi-
ness after their marriage. Since the plain-
tiff had expressed the desire not to marry
until he was able to support his wife, the
misrepresentation of the wife as to her
financial status was held to be a fraud
affecting the essence of the marital con-
tract. The Court added that the material-
ity of the fraud was to be determined on
an ad hoc basis. 1'3 It was found that the
defendant had misrepresented a material
fact without which the marital relation-
ship would not have been created.
In general, fraud supporting the annul-
ment may be classified as suggestio falsi,
an actual falsehood, or suggestio veri, the
suppression or concealment of the truth. 4
The concealment or non-disclosure of
certain facts' 5 or intentions 16 will justify
annulment when they go to the essence of
the contract" and are of a character
which, considering the relation of trust
and confidence, ought to be disclosed. 8
1" Smith v. Smith, 44 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658,
251 N.Y. Supp. 474 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
12Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184
N.E. 60 (1933).
13 Ibid.; see Crouch, supra note 6, at 407.
14 Op. cit. supra note 1.
15 Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N.Y. 54, 70 N.E.
120 (1904); Yucabezky v. Yucabezky, 111
N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Costello v. Cos-
tello, 155 Misc. 28, 279 N.Y. Supp. 303 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).
16Ryan v. Ryan, 156 Misc. 251, 281 N.Y.
Supp. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
'7 Roth v. Roth, 97 Misc. 136, 142, 161 N.Y.
Supp. 99, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
18Yucabezky v. Yucabezky, supra note 15;
Eldredge v. Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
RECENT DECISIONS
Thus, fraud was found sufficiently ma-
terial to void a marriage where a party
represented himself as a person of good
character and not addicted to drugs, 19 or
where there was a concealment of con-
viction of a serious crime, such as rape20
or other felony.21 In addition, fraud con-
cerning physical and mental incapacity, 22
prior marriage and divorce, 23 citizenship
and ancestry,24 as well as fraud to effect
entrance into the country, 25 have been
deemed sufficient to grant annulments.2 6
After fifty years of liberal interpretation
of that which is material to the marriage
contract, the Court of Appeals, in Woron-
zoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkofl,27
introduced the concept that the fraud must
relate to something vital to the marriage
relationship.
There, the Court refused an annulment
based upon allegations that the defendant,
an impoverished Russian nobleman,
fraudulently stated to plaintiff, a wealthy
Indian woman, that he had always earned
19 O'Connell v. O'Connell, supra note 7. •
20 Giannotti v. Giannotti, 60 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
21 Graves v. Graves, 27 Misc. 2d 436, 52
N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
2_ Alter v. Alter, 250 App. Div. 428, 294 N.Y.
Supp. 195 (2d Dep't 1937); Friedman v. Fried-
man, 187 Misc. 689, 64 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct.
1946).
23 Costello v. Costello, supra note 15.
24 Protopapas v. Protopapas, 47 N.Y.S.2d 460
(Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 267 App. Div. 804, 47
N.Y.S.2d 287 (1st Dep't 1943); Siecht v. Siecht,
41 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
2-- Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 173 Misc. 587,
18 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Rubman v.
Rubman, supra note 11.
26 See generally 18 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA
oIr NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 23-37 (1955); note,
Fraud and Annulment in New York, 41 COLUM.
L. REV. 503 (1941).
27 303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E.2d 877 (1952).
his own living, and promised to find em-
ployment subsequent to their marriage.
While not advocating a return to the es-
sentialia concept, the Court concluded
that annulments should not be granted
"for any and every kind of fraud," but
only for fraud as to matters deemed vital
to the marriage relationship. It was held
that the representations of the defendant,
even though they might have deceived the
plaintiff, were not vital to this particular
marriage.2 8
The scope of the "vital" rule was not
indicated, but in the implementation of
this concept there has been no discernible
change in the liberal attitude of the lower
courts. Although annulments have been
denied on the authority of Woronzoff-
Daschkoff, the same results might well
have been reached by application of the
earlier rule enunciated in di Lorenzo.
Annulments were refused under both tests
for fraudulent representations of. love and
affection; 29 for concealment of mere bad
habits;10  for concealment of mother's
mental incompetency;" and for conceal-
ment of premarital incontinence.12 There
28 Id. at 512, 104 N.E.2d at 880.
29 Compare Cantor v. Cantor, 40 Misc. 2d 642,
234 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1962), modified,
18 App. Div. 2d 808, 236 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2d
Dep't 1963), with Bernardino v. Bernardino,
156 Misc. 203, 280 N.Y. Supp. 13 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
20Compare Baxter v. Baxter, 11 Misc. 2d 69,
169 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1957), with Smith
v. Smith, 44 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1943) and
Jones v. Jones, 189 Misc. 145, 69 N.Y.S.2d 223
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
31Compare Hameister v. Hameister, 28 Misc.
2d 796, 216 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
with Natoli v. Natoli 72 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
32 Compare Musso v. Musso, 143 N.Y.S.2d 331
are, moreover, positive indications that
the utilization of the "vital" test has
wrought little actual change in prior de-
cisional law. For example, in Matter of
Rivette,33  a disciplinary proceeding
against an attorney for advising the insti-
tution of an annulment action upon insuf-
ficient ground, the court indicated that a
vital element was to be defined as "a
material fact concerning which, if de-
fendant had known the truth, he or she
would not have entered into the marriage
contract. 2
34
The instant case reached the Court of
Appeals on the question of whether the
fraudulent concealment was vital to the
marriage. 35 It was alleged that although
the defendant was a firm advocate of
genocide of the Jewish race, he concealed
this during courtship by his seemingly
agreeable association with plaintiff's Jew-
ish friends. Plaintiff further contended
that she relied on this representation, and
had she known his true character as later
manifested, she would not have entered
into the marriage.36 Stating the Shonfeld
"but, for" materiality test, the Court held
that a trier of the facts could, if the facts
alleged should be proven, conclude that
had the true facts been known to plaintiff,
she would not have consented to the mar-
riage.3 7
(Sup. Ct. 1955), wit/i Glean v. Glean, 70 App.
Div. 576, 75 N.Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dep't 1902).
33 283 App. Div. 439, 128 N.Y.S.2d 325 (4th
Dep't 1954).
34 Id. at 440, 128 N.Y.S.2d at 325-26.
2. Kober v. Kober, 16 N.Y.2d 191, 192, 211
N.E.2d 817, 818, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (1965).
36 Id. at 196-97, 211 N.E.2d at 820, 264
N.Y.S.2d at 369.
37 Id. at 197, 211 N.E.2d at 820, 264 N.Y.S.2d
at 368-69.
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The dissenters voted to affirm upon
the basis of the majority opinion of the
appellate division.18 There, it was thought
that the husband's past and present be-
liefs were unrelated to elements vital to
the marriage relationship. The dissenting
judges apparently agreed that matters of
political and philosophical beliefs do not
impair the agreement to marry and ought
to be compromised by the parties them-
selves during their union. 39 In addition,
the dissenters seemingly concur that the
"law could not lay down a viable line of
separation between political and philo-
sophical views too extreme to be con-
cealed during the courtship from those not
so extreme which may be concealed.. -. "
The majority, on the other hand, saw
the beliefs of the defendant as more than
mere political views. They were consid-
ered fanatical convictions evidencing a
diseased mind comparable to lunacy or
idiocy, themselves ground for annulment.41
The defendant's continued adherence to
those beliefs, it was thought,
would so plainly make the marital rela-
tionship unworkable in this jurisdiction...
that it would depart from the realities to
conclude that [the concealment] was not
essential to this married relationship, or
that . . . plaintiff would have consented
to the marriage without its concealment. 42
38 Kober v. Kober, 22 App. Div. 2d 468, 256
N.Y.S.2d 615 (1st Dep't 1965).
39d. at 471, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
40 Ibid. The court conceded however, that un-
der different circumstances, the same misrepre-
sentation might be vital. Id. at 472, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 619.
41 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c).
42Kober v. Kober, supra note 35, at 197, 211
N.E.2d at 821, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 369. (Em-
phasis added.)
RECENT DECISIONS
This being so, it could be found, the Court
concluded, "that the facts alleged, if es-
stablished by evidence, would go to the
essence of her consent to marry him.1'43
Basically, the Court applied the rules
promulgated in Woronzofl-Daschkojj: it
required more than a material fraud, i.e.,
one but for which the plaintiff would not
have married the defendant. Holding that
the plaintiff stated a cause of action, it
concluded that there was a triable issue
as to whether the concealment affected a
vital aspect of the marriage relationship.4 4
The justification for this holding is that
the marriage would not be "workable" in
this jurisdiction. 45  In so deciding, the
Court of Appeals has given the "vital"
issue broad definition by injecting the ele-
ment of subjectivity inherent in such an
approach. Thus, the personalities of the
parties, as affected by place and circum-
stance, are factors to be considered. The
courts have been adverse to such consid-
erations when dealing with materiality in
earlier cases.46 In the instant case, it was
4 Id. at 198, 211 N.E.2d at 821, 264 N.Y.S.2d
at 370.
44Id. at 197, 211 N.E.2d at 821, 264 N.Y.S.2d
at 369-70.
45 Compare Douglass v. Douglass, 148 Cal. App.
2d 867, 307 P.2d 674 (1957) (concealment of
criminal record and true character). "Either
party has a right to a decree of annulment
where the fraud is so grievous that it places
the injured party in a relationship which is
intolerable because it cannot be honorably en-
dured." Id. at 870, 307 P.2d at 676.
4 di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67
N.E. 63 (1903).
not the mere fact that the defendant was
at one time a Nazi officer (which in itself
was considered insufficient), but rather, the
continuation of the defendant's beliefs
which caused the disruption in the mar-
riage.47
If the Kober rationale is strictly applied
in the future, the trier of the facts will be
able to judge what is "vital" to the marital
union by looking at the present status of
compatability of the parties as affected
by the fraud.48
This presents a danger of dilution of
the prudent man standard as applied to
the determination of the fraud.
There is no doubt that, as the Court
has held, the beliefs of the defendant are
reprehensible and shocking to the mind
and sensibilities of an average person in
New York. Such belief, if concealed,
could well be considered "vital" to a mar-
riage. However, it is hoped that the
grievous nature of the facts alleged in the
instant case will be considered in limiting
the application of the Kober rationale,
since the mere factor of incompatability
might well open the door to collusive liti-
gants. It is submitted that no test was
intended here by the Court, but only a
guideline to be considered in cases as they
are presented.
47Supra note 35, at 197, 211 N.E.2d at 821,
264 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
48 The question is left open, however, as to
whether the same result would have been
reached if the defendant had reformed subse-
quent to the marriage.
